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Akriton Apokteinai: Execution without Trial

in Fourth-Century Athens
Edwin M Carawan

T

of Athenian legal procedure and the growing
power of the courts has been a major focus of work on Athenian law for more than a quarter-century. The studies of H. 1.
Wolff and M. H. Hansen have shown how the sovereignty of the
courts in the fourth century was built upon the 'suit for illegality'
(graphe paranomon), the paragraphe to bar litigation, 'impeachment'
(eisangelia), and related procedures. 1 On the other hand, 'denunciation' and 'summary arrest', endeixis and apagoge, have been regarded
as exceptions to the principle of the sovereignty of the court, 8LKaCIT-ryPWlJ 7TalJTWlJ idJPWlJ. Hansen has suggested that the magistrates
in charge in these procedures, the Eleven, the thesmothetai, or the
council of 500, often ordered execution without trial, TO aKpLTOlJ
a7TOKTEtlJat. 2 This conclusion is based on two arguments: first, it is
assumed that the law gave the archon authority for execution not
only in apagoge, for which we have many references, but also in endeixis, which is understood as another stage of the same procedure~
second, it is argued that a number of passages in the extant authors
allude to executions in these procedures as though they were comHE EVOLUTION

1 The work of E. Ruschenbusch, "/ltKO(rTT,PWII 7TallTwlI KVPWII," Historia 6 (1957)
257-74, led to a reconsideration of some traditional views on the Athenian legal system: the modern notion of 'separation of powers' had no place in Athenian government; and the idea that the assembly of the people held supreme authority is unfounded. See H. J. Wolff, "Normencontrolle" und Gesetzesbegriffin der attischen Demokratie (SitzHeidelberg 1970) 60-67; and M. H. Hansen, The Sovereignty oj the People's
Court (Odense 1974) 15-18,62-65; on paragraphe, H. 1. Wolff, Die attische Paragraphe
(Weimar 1966); on the sovereignty of the courts in eisangelia, M. H. Hansen, Eisangelia (Odense 1975) 51-55.
2 M. H. Hansen has concluded, in Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis (Odense 1976)
118-19, that, although the courts had assumed sovereignty in political disputes (through
the graphe paranomon and eisangelia), in criminal cases including apagoge and endeixis
there was no forward evolution in the administration of justice, but the Draconian
principles of arrest and execution continued in practice; in these procedures "penalties
were often inflicted without trial." For the traditional view see J. H. Lipsius, Das
attische Recht und RechtsverJahren II (Leipzig 1908) 317-21, 331-35; A. R. W. Harrison, The Law oj Athens II (Oxford 1972) 221-30; and the discussion in Hansen, Apagoge 9-11.

III
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monplace. 3 On closer examination, however, it will be clear that
neither argument is compelling, and even in apagoge the sovereignty
of the court was unquestioned.
Two issues are involved: what were the provisions of statutory law;
and what were the procedures in common practice. By law apagoge
led to execution without trial if the accused were arrested E7T' alJro¢Wpq>, and if they confessed their crimes; but in practice there may
have been very few executions on the archons' orders. The clearest
testimonia on the statute for execution in apagoge are found in Aeschines 1.91, 113, and Aristotle Ath.Pol. 52.1:
Aeschin. 1.91: TL') "lap Tl TWV AW7T08vTWV Tl TWV /.UJLXWV Tl TWV
av8pocPOvwv Tl TWV Tel pJyuTTa J)1v a8LKOlivTWV, Aa(Jpl!- 8E TOVTO
,
!i:' '
s::: '
\
It""
,l...1!~
7TpaTTOVTWV,
uWUEt
uLK71
v; KaL,"lap
TOVTWV
OL /-LEV E7T aVToo/UlPcp
aAOVTE'), €aV Of.LOAOYWUL, 7TapaxpT,,.,.a (JavaTcp ~T/f.LLOVVTaL, oi 8E
,
, "1::
'
,
, , , , , s:::
'
Aa (J OVTE') KaL E<:,apVOL YLYV0/-LEVOt KptlJOVTaL EV TOt') utKauTT/ptoL').

1.113: oi 8E VO/-LOt KEAEVOVUL TWV KAE7TTWV TOV') /-LEV Of.LOAOYOVVTa,)
(JavaTcp ~71f.LLOvu(JaL, TOV,> 8' apvOV/-LEVOV,> KptVEU(Jat.
Ath.Pol. 52.1: ... TOV') Ev8EKa ... Kat TOV') a7TaY0/-LEVOV,> KAE7TTa'>
,
, ';:'
;:,
,
,
'\
;:,'
"
, [, \
Kat TOV') aVupa7TOutUTa') Kat TOV,> l\.W7TouVTa,>, av /-LEV Of.LOI\.OYW]UL 4 (JavaTcp ~71,.,.uVUOVTa'), av 8' aI-UPtul371TWUtlJ EiuagovTa') Ei')
TO 8LKaUTl1Ptov.

From these passages it appears that the archons in the fourth century
still had authority to execute felons who had been arrested in flagrante delicto, "if they confess"; but Aeschines' comments (1.91)
suggest that criminals seldom confessed to capital crimes. The accused was not likely to confess if he knew that his life was at stake,
and without a confession it is difficult to see how the archon could
have given a verdict in the anakrisis. It is possible that the archon still
had some authority to interpret the statements or actions of the
accused as admission of guilt (and this may be the broader meaning
of E7T' aVTocpwpq> and Ea" d~AoYW(J",), but we have very little evidence to suggest that the archon often exercised such authority to
order execution without trial.5 The statute for execution in apagoge
3 Hansen, Apagoge 18, claims "we have ample evidence that endeixis sometimes led
to arrest and immediate execution"; among references to execution in apagoge and
related procedures he cites Lys. 6.18 (referring to the outlawry proclaimed against those
implicated in the profanation of the Mysteries); 13.67, 78 (which refer to military
executions in wartime); Oem. 23.31; 24.65, 208; as well as Aeschin. 1.91, 113, and
Ath.Pol. 52.1 (quoted in/ra).
4 Kenyon's restoration, from Lex.Seg. 310.4 and Poll. 8.102, is surely right; see the
discussion and bibliography in P. J. Rhodes, Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion
Politeia (Oxford 1981) 581.
5 From Lys. 13.85-87 it is clear that hr' aVToqxVpo/ was open to interpretation; Hansen
has argued convincingly (Apagoge 48-52, cf GRBS 22 [1981] 28-29) that arrest hr'
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was still on the books, but whether it was often invoked is another
question.
The magistrates may have had authority to order execution in a
greater number of cases if, in fact, endeixis could also lead to execution without trial. Lipsius had assumed that endeixis was available
only against exiles who returned without reprieve and atimoi who
violated prohibitions, and that only exiles could be executed by this
procedure; but Hansen has argued that the criteria for apagoge and
endeixis were not the crimes themselves and the penalties prescribed,
but the roles of the accuser and the archon in the procedure, and
thus even kakourgoi, liable to arrest and execution, could be prosecuted by endeixis. 6 In practice, however, the nature of the crime
determined the procedure: ordinarily, arrest was the most effective
means of bringing felons to justice; denunciation was in order when
exiles returned without reprieve.
Hansen has shown that in endeixis the prosecutor himself either
makes the arrest, as in apagoge, or summons the accused to appear
before the archon. 7 This means that endeixis involves the following
procedure: (1) the archon, in effect, gives warrant for the arrest or
summons; (2) the prosecutor brings his charges before the archon,
the Eleven, or the thesmothetai; (3) the prosecutor himself either
makes the arrest or summons the accused to appear before the archon; (4) there must have been some preliminary hearing or anakrisis in which the accused was questioned, entered his plea, and may
have cross-examined his accusers; this hearing would lead to (5) trial
or execution. 8 Thus endeixis is appropriate only when the prosecutor
alJToqxd{X!J refers to apprehension of the criminal 'in discovery of the theft' (as furtum
mani/estum), and not necessarily 'caught in the act' as it is often interpreted. iav O/-WAOYWfIt, however, was not open to interpretation; see infra on Oem. 25 hypo 1-2.
6 See Lipsius (supra n.2) 331-35. On endeixis kakourgon cf Hansen, Apagoge 18-20,
36-38; and Harrison (supra n.2) 23l.
7 Whereas Lipsius (331) had held that in endeixis the thesmothetai make the arrest,
Hansen has shown that, in endeixis as well as in apagoge, it is the prosecutor who
makes the arrest (Apagoge 13-17). This is now generally accepted: D. M. MacDowell,
The Law in Classical Athens (Ithaca 1978) 58 and n.86; Rhodes (supra nA) 580-82 on
Ath.Pol. 52.l; but cf G. Lalonde, AlP 99 (978) 132-33.
8 The first procedural requirement in endeixis was that the accuser make his denun-

ciation to the archon before he arrested or summoned the accused. This basic distinction between endeixis and apagoge is disregarded by Hansen, but the fact that the endeixis should be brought before the competent authority (cf Hansen, Apagoge 20,
28-30) suggests that the archon had some authority to reject the endeixis if there were
patent falsification or illegality; the role of the boule in rejecting Meidias' proposal for
arrest and execution against Aristarchus (Oem. 21.116, cf infra) suggests that the prejudicial authority was expected to exercise some discretion. In some cases the archon's
'warrant' may have been a formality, but the importance of the endeixis proper, the
denunciation before the magistrate, is indicated in several references: e.g. PI. Ap. 32B
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has a strong prima Jacie case, sufficient to convince the archon to
authorize a forcible arrest, when the accused is expected to resist
arrest, contest the charges, or evade them by going into exile. Endeixis would not be a very effective remedy against, for example,
robbery in progress; instead, endeixis seems designed to enforce legal
prohibitions, exile or disfranchisement. For violators of disfranchisement (atimo;) jury trial was guaranteed; for exiles who returned
without reprieve, Hansen would argue, endeixis could lead to immediate execution.9
As evidence for execution without trial in endeixis, Hansen cites
only three testimonia from fourth-century sources, none of which, I
shall argue, is compelling: 10
Ath.Pol. 29.4: ... EVSEL/;Lv avTOv ElvaL Kat cX1raywYT1" 'TTpo~ TOW;
U'TpaTT/YOVc;, TOV~ Se U'TpaTT/Y0W; 'TTapaSOVvaL TOt~ EvSEKa 8avclTcp
{"fI~U'aL.
Lys. 6.15: EelV piv TL~ IXlJSpo~ U'wf.UX TPWcrn .,. O~TO~ ,.u.v KaTel
TOW; VOJ.Wl}{O TOV~ EI; 'ApEiov 'TTayov c!H;VI;ETat T7]V TOV aSLK"fI8EVTO~
'TTOALlJ, Kat EelV KaTiYl EvSELX8EIS 8avaTcp {"fIf..UW8T,U'ETaL.
cpOvov Se SiKa~ f..L7] ElvaL f..L"fIooJ.Wv KaTel TWV TOV~
.,
,
, ,
,
d
\
EVuELKVVVTWV, Eav TIS KaTLYI O'TTOL f..L"fI E~EU'TLV.

Oem. 23.51:
A..r '

'f""vyOVTa~

~

~J:.

The Ath.Pol. passage seems irrelevant here, as it refers to a decree
of the year 411 against any prosecutors who brought graphai paranomon or eisangeliai to obstruct the government of the Four Hundred. We may assume that arrest and execution were a common
practice under the oligarchies, but these precedents were invalidated
under the democratic judiciary.11
The argument at Lys. 6.15, in the case against Andocides, lends
very little support to the notion that endeixis could lead to execution
(ETOLf,UJJII OIlTWII EIISEUWUllat /-LE Kat a1T(lYEtv) suggests that to prevent Socrates from
'obstructing justice' the prosecutors must first denounce him before they could forcibly
remove him from the assembly; cf Oem. 20.156, 53.11; Hyp. 5.29; and see the discussion in Hansen, Apagoge 15.
9 Hansen, Apagoge 18-19, and Lipsius (supra n.2) 319, 331-32.
10 To these he adds Poll. 8.49; but the lexicographer's explanation seems to be simply
an inference from references in the extant speeches: eIlSE~t'; Se iJ 7TpOf; TOil apXOIITa
OJ,.WAOYOV,.,.,EIIOV a8tKTJIUXTOf; ILTJIIVaW, OV KPWEWf; aAAa Ttf,UJJPLaf; 8eo,.,.,EIIOV; cf Oem.
21.182, 24.146, 53.14, and 58.52 (eIlSE~t/I KEAEVEt Kat aMaf; Ttf,UJJPLaf;).
11 For execution without trial under the oligarchies (1500 under the Thirty according
to Isoc. 7.67, 20.11) cf Thuc. 8.48, Oem. 40.46, Lycurg. Leoe. 121. Autocratic methods under the oligarchy may have affected procedure for a short time after the restoration, but such methods were soon abandoned; cf R. Rauchenstein, "Ueber die
Apagoge in der Rede des Lysias gegen den Agoratos," Philologus 5 (850) 514; P. J.
Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (Oxford 1972) 182-83.
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without trial, for the focus of the speaker's arguments is the jury's
responsibility in cases of assault and homicide as in the endeixis of
exiles. The speaker argues that, since those exiled for assault of
persons may be punished with death if they return, the jurors should
be all the more zealous in the punishment of those who assault the
gods themselves. In comparing those who assault other citizens with

the infamous Hermokopidai, the speaker is not suggesting that the
offender should be executed without trial, but that he should meet
with the same condemnation that the jury would give to a murderer
or assailant. Ev8Etx.Oels OaveXTcp ~'YJf..UWOT,(JeTa" simply prescribes the
death penalty for convictions by this procedure, and does not suggest
that the accuser's denunciation is sufficient for execution~ after all,
the term endeixis often refers to the whole procedure from denunciation to trial. Furthermore, in this case and in others involving the endeixis of exiles, it may not be altogether accurate to speak of execution without trial, since the accused had been given trial in the
legal action which led to his exile. 12 If he has gone into exile to avoid
trial, this is considered to be admission of guilt; if he has been convicted and condemned, then he must face the death penalty if he
returns~ but if he returns from exile the accused may have some new
evidence or there may have been changes in the law to overturn the
prior conviction, and in this way the endeixis would lead to a new
trial, as in the case against Andocides. 13
The statute cited in Dem. 23.51 is the most difficult to interpret,
although it says simply, "There shall be no prosecution for homicide (by dike phonou) against those who denounce exiles, if anyone
should return where prohibited." Some authors have assumed that
this law should be interpreted as a safeguard for those who bring the
endeixis against charges of homicide for executions carried out by the
Eleven or other magistrates without trial.1 4 But this explanation hard12 The automatic penalty prescribed for condemned men who returned from exile
without reprieve is analogous in Anglo-American law to the sentence upon a convicted
criminal who escapes from prison: "The rule is well established as common law that a
prisoner who escapes from custody while serving his sentence for a criminal offense is
liable to recapture and confinement to serve out his sentence," American Jurisprudence
XV (San Francisco/New York 1939) 368; this rule applies even to the death penalty
(cj infra n. 22).
13 Changes in the law may have persuaded some exiles to return, as in the case of
Andocides, whose atimia was revoked by the decree of Patrocleides; in the early years
of the restoration, the amnesty may have encouraged many men, condemned under
the Thirty or guilty of crimes under the Thirty, to return from exile. For the admissibility of new evidence see my comments in GRBS 24 (1983) 220 and n.31; cj Harrison (supra n.2) 97 and n.2.
14 See Hansen, Apagoge 16, 26.
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ly seems adequate: if the judgment for execution were contested by
the relatives, it would seem more suitable for them to bring charges
against the archon at his euthyna and to pursue other legal remedies
against the prosecutor who made the denunciation. I5 It seems more
likely that the law is intended to safeguard the prosecutor, who
has, in effect, obtained a warrant, in the event the accused is killed
in the arrest, and thus to discourage the accused from resisting arrest. Execution without trial is not mentioned, although it would
have been pertinent to the speaker's argument against Aristocrates'
decree.
There is some evidence, moreover, that a trial would have been
necessary in endeixis, either required by law or unavoidable in practice. The author of the Ath.Pol. seems to draw a distinction between
the procedures in apagoge and endeixis in his discussion of the duties
of the Eleven (52.1): he says that the Eleven have the authority to
carry out execution without trial if the accused confesses the crime in
apagoge, but in endeixis the responsibilities of the Eleven are to bring
the case to court, and to carry out the execution if the jury's verdict
is 'guilty'. From this distinction between the archon's duties in endeixis and apagoge, there is a clear implication that the Eleven were
not called upon to carry out execution without trial in endeixis.
Thus the law seems to carry no specific provision for execution in
endeixis, and when we turn to examine the proposals for execution in
apagoge, it seems more likely that such remedies were extraordinary
measures, later regarded as unconstitutional by speakers and jurors
alike.
(1) The clearest case of apagoge leading to execution without trial
occurred in the first year of the restoration: an unknown democrat
was arrested by Archinus and brought before the boule for violation
of the amnesty, and in that hearing he was condemned to death (Ath.
Pol. 40.2): 'Apxtvot; ... E'TrEi TIS T1pgaTo nov KaTEA'Y/AvOOTWV JLV'Y/UL,. ."

,

,. . .

",

KaKELv, a7Tayaywv TOVTOV E'TrL T'Y/V

f3

\..'

,

I."

,

ov"'T/v KaL 'TrELa-at; aKpLTOV a'TrO-

Our only source is Aristotle's Ath.Pol., so that we have
no clear indication what procedures were followed to decide the case
in the preliminary hearing before the boule. The author of the Ath.
Pol. tells us only that, after the execution, there were no other cases
KTEtVaL ...

15 The prosecution of Agoratus (Lys. 13) suggests that those whose false information
led to execution could themselves be prosecuted by apagoge; the prosecution of Menestratus by apagoge (mentioned in Lys. 13.55-57) points to the same conclusion. In
other circumstances it may have been possible to prosecute for complicity in illegal
execution by other means, such as probo/e, as in the case against CaIlixeinus for his
role in the trial of the generals (Xen. Hel. 1.7.35).
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7rW7TOTE

VUTE-

€J,Ll'.."UI,KaK.."O"Ev. 16

We know that sometime after Archinus' apagoge the council was
prohibited from ordering the death penalty (Ath.Pol. 45.1), and it
seems evident that the council had not been in the habit of ordering
executions before the tyranny of the Thirty. In fact, it appears that

the bouleutic oath prohibited execution without jury trial in the later
fourth century P Two apparent exceptions to this principle are found
in the cases against the Bosporan banker mentioned in Isoc. 17.42
and against the metic grain dealers in Lysias 22. Both cases involve
the prosecution of persons who were not Athenian citizens, but even
in these cases it appears that the boule was reluctant to condemn the
accused to death without trial.l 8
(2) In making his case against Pasion, the banker from the Bosporus suggested that in an earlier arrest he had narrowly escaped the
barathron,19 7TUpa J,LtKPOl' TlA,(Jol' aKpI,TO~ a7ToOal'ELl' (Isoc. 17.42), but
this is no more than the usual appeal for sympathy; in fact, the proposal for execution had been rejected and the defendant was released
on bond.
This case was initiated by 'information' or phasis, and in this case,
as in the next, there is doubt about the precise classification of the
procedure, but, as in the case against the grain dealers, most scholars
agree that the proper procedure was apagoge .20 The legal status of the
defendants may have made them seem easy targets for arrest and
summary execution.
(3) In the case against the grain dealers (Lysias 22.2), the speaker
tells us that the defendants were taken into custody and questioned
16 Aristotle's comment may suggest either that the execution in this case was a very
effective deterrent, or that the judicial powers of the boule in this instance were later
regarded as unconstitutional; cj. Rhodes (supra n.4) 477-78.
17 See the discussion by K. von Fritz and E. Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution of Athens
(New York 1950) 188 n.152. Cj. [Andoc.l Against Alcibiades 3 (TCtJ OPKqJ 7"01) S,.qIJ.OV Kat
TT/~ f30VAT/~ ... EKEt /.LEV ya.p O/.LVVTE Wf/Seva /.L,.qTE EgEAav /.L,.qTE S,.qUEtV /.L,.qTE a1TOKTEVELV aKpLTov), with Harrison (supra n.2) 50 and n.l.
1M The Chalkis decree UG P 40.9) of 446/5 shows that the guarantee of trial before
the people extended to some non-Athenians even in the fifth century: ovsi a1ToKTEvO
ovSE xpeJ.LaTa a¢atpeUOJ.LaL aKptTO ovSEvck .
19 For methods of execution see L. Gernet, "Sur l'executlon capitale," REG 37
(924) 261-93 (repr. in Anthropologie de la Grece antique [Paris 19681, tr. 1. Hamilton
and B. Nagy [Baltimore 1981]). Irving Barkan, however, Capital Punishment in Ancient
Athens (Chicago 1936) 72, 81-82, concluded that the barathron had fallen into disuse
by the end of the fifth century; but cf. Lipsius (supra n.2) 77. Apotympanismos (not
precisely crucifixion as Gernet supposed) continued to be used in some cases even
after hemlock had been adopted generally as the more humane means of execution.
20 See Harrison (supra n.2) 222 and n.3; cf. Hansen, Eisangelia 41, 114, Apagoge 31.
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in the council; some members had moved for execution without trial,
but the speaker had moved for trial before a court of the people
"according to the law"; in his words there is a clear implication that
execution would have been illegal: 21
EAeyoJl TLJlE~ T;;)JI in)TOpWJI ~ aKpiTo~ aVTOtK; xpi, 7'Ot~ ElISEKa
7TapaOOVlIat fJaJl(lTcp ~T'/~at . " alla(77'Cr.~ Ei7TOll 071. JLOt ooKoin
KPLlIELlI 7'OtK; UtTo7TwAa" KaTCr. TOll 1I0JLOlI.

(4) The incident mentioned in Demosthenes' speech Against Aristocrates (Dem. 23.31) is the only other example after Archinus'
apagoge which appears to involve arrest procedures leading to execution without trial:
oi fJEUJLOfJETat 7'OV~ E7Tt cf>OlICP c/1EtryOllTa~ ,roPWt fJall(hcp ~T'/~at,
Kat TOll EK Tij" EKKAT'/uia~ 7TEPVUtll 7TallTE~ EwpafJ' 1m' EKEillWlI
,
Ll '
a7Ta
X17E lITa.

The context of the arguments (27-36), however, tends to dispel the
notion that such procedures often led to execution without trialindeed, we cannot be sure even in this case that the exile was executed. In the speaker's argument, Aristocrates' decree contradicts existing homicide law on two points: the outlawry proclaimed against
those who would assassinate Charidemus first denies trial before the
court, and second denies the authority of the thesmothetai to carry out
the jury's verdict. The main point of the argument is that the decree
disregards the authority of the courts and the officers of the courts.
In defining his terms the speaker has made it clear that those who
are executed by the thesmothetai are murderers convicted by the
court, T01)1'OV av8pocJxJvov AE)'Et TOV EUAWKOT' Ti 8'Y1 rfi l/J-fJqxp (29);
and the illegality of Aristocrates' decree lies in this very provision for
the execution of suspected assassins without jury trial, 1T'Upu{3Cx.c; TO
StwPtU~VOV EK 1'01) VO/-WV 8tKUUT-fJpWV aKptTOV ... (27). In the
recent incident to which the speaker refers (31), the thesmothetai
themselves made the arrest, acting on the accuser's information by
the alternate procedure ephegesis, against a convicted murderer who
had returned from exile. The whole point of the argument is that the
accused must be first convicted, and then if a convicted murderer
returns from exile it is the office of the thesmothetai to see that the
sentence is carried out. It is not altogether accurate to regard this
procedure as execution without trial, and the term akriton apokteinai
is not used in reference to the office of the thesmothetai. 22
21 Hansen, Apagoge 34, however, interprets the speaker's argument differently, despite the phrase KUTU T(JI) V0I-WV.
22 Since the convicted murderer was, in effect, sentenced to death but escaped execution by fleeing into exile (cj. Harrison [supra n.21 185-86), the case here is analo-
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Even in this instance we must assume that the thesmothetai held a
hearing (1) to determine proof of identity - is the accused man the
convicted murderer; and (2) to hear arguments against the prior
conviction-indeed, it is unlikely that the convicted man would have
appeared in the assembly without some legal recourse. 23 Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the speaker would have made reference
to this incident if the accused had been executed without trial; again,
one of the grounds of the graphe paranomon is that Aristocrates'
decree punishes the accused as though convicted:
1TWS- ovv av ns- piXAAOV EAf.=:YXOE':T} 1Tapavo/J.' Eip'TJKWS- ... TO TOV
,
"."
." a ' "
T'TJV aLTtav EXOVTOS- EAapES- ov0IJ-a, T'TJV uE n/-UlJptav, 'TJV OVuE KaTa
TeVV E~EA'TJAeyp£vwv 8LBOaaw Ot VOIJ.OL, TaVT'TJV Kanl TeVV aKpiTWV
E,,/pa"'as- (36).
,~\

I

~

,~,

,

(5) The proposal for execution mentioned in Demosthenes' speech
Against Meidias (21.116) also involved the procedure known as ephegesis in a prosecution for homicide, but in this case we know that the
proposal was rejected: O~TO~ "ayvoeLT'" et:PTJ "CfJ {30VA-q, TO 7Tpayf..UX;
Kat TOV aVTOXELp' eXOVTe~ .,. OVK a7ToKTeveLTe;" In this curious
document the proposal for execution is put in the mouth of Meidias
as yet another example of his unscrupulous methods. In this instance, in the year 348 Meidias proposed in the council that Aristarchus, whom he had accused of murder, be arrested and executed
without trial; the proposal was rejected, and instead Aristarchus was
later prosecuted by the ordinary procedure dike phonou; he went into
exile and was convicted in absentia. 24
If we are to believe that such proposals were lawful we must disregard the testimony of Aristotle that the boule was formally denied
the authority to order execution soon after the restoration. 25 All the
references thus far point to the conclusion that arrest and execution
gous to that of a condemned man in this country who escapes and is recaptured and
returned to death row. The case of Linwood Briley in Virginia is an apt example (see
the Richmond Times Dispatch, June 19-21, 1984): sentenced to be executed in August, he escaped, was recaptured, and (after waiving the identification hearing) was
returned to Virginia to face execution. We would not regard this as execution without
trial, nor did the Athenians. In a print-out for aKpLTOIJ from the Thesaurus Linguae
Graecae, I find no instance where the term is used of this automatic penalty on order
of the thesmothetai.
23 In reference to this passage and Lycurg. Leoc. 121, Harrison (supra n.2) 17 reasons that, although the thesmothetai "may at one time have had this executive power"
(of putting to death exiles who returned without reprieve), in the classical period the
accused "surely had the opportunity to plead before a court, maintaining for example
that it was a case of mistaken identity." Cf D. M. MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law
(Manchester 1963) 121 f.
24 Cf Aeschin. 1.172; Hansen, Apagoge 137.
25 See supra 117; Rhodes (supra n.1l) 181-94.
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without trial were common practice only under the oligarchic regimes
of 411 and 404, and afterward were regarded as undemocratic if not
unconstitutional.
(6) The last instance, described in the hypothesis to Dem. 25 Against
Aristogeiton, concerns a proposal for summary execution brought before the ekklesia, but even here, in the assembly of the people, the
sovereignty of the courts was upheld: 26
\.' ~pOV
rlJ
8' tEpa
'" \ tlJ.aTta ... a7Ta,),OV{Tt 7TpOe; TOVC; 7TPV. .. 'I EpOKA.Ea
'
, A,.L _I,',#.,.
~ \
TaVEte; we; tEPO(TlJA.OV . . . ''ApW"TO')'EtTWV
')'pa~t 'Y"fJo/UTIJ.a ... Eav
JJlv OJ.LOAOyfi T<X i,.w.Tta egEVE')'KEI,V, Cl'lT08aVEI,v aVTov aVTiKa ...
<l>aVO{TTpaTOe; ... ai-pEl, 7TapavO/.UJJv (hyp. 1-2).
If

,

If

If

,

"

"
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In the year 33211 Pythangelus and Skaphon arrested Hierocles and
brought him before the prytaneis on a charge of temple robbery; the
sacred garments had been found in his possession. In the ekklesia

Aristogeiton proposed that the accused be condemned to death if he
admitted having taken the sacred himatia, in effect disallowing the
defendant's plea that he had acted on order from the priestess. Aristogeiton's proposal meant that the pre-judicial authority, in this case
the ekklesia acting in the role of the archon at the preliminary hearing, should interpret admission of the fact as admission of guilt. By
law, however, the accused has the right to trial before the people if
he denies the charges; the proposal for execution was indicted for
illegality and Aristogeiton was convicted.
In all the references to proposals for execution without trial in
apagoge and related procedures, we have only one clear testimony
that the execution was actually carried out, and that singular example
comes soon after the restoration: Archinus' prosecution before the
boule against an unknown adversary accused of violating the amnesty.
In their verdict in this instance the boule may have been willing to
sacrifice some legal principles to avert a greater threat to the constitution, but their exercise of this power was shortlived. Afterward,
in the case against the grain dealers (3) and in Meidias' proposal
for execution against Aristarchus (5), as in Aristogeiton's proposal
against Hierocles (6), the judicial power proposed for the boule and
the ekklesia would have been illegal. In each case the proposal for
execution without trial was rejected and the sovereignty of the court
was upheld.
26 There seems to be a reference to this procedure in the speech itself (25.87): OV
'Yap 0J.LOWv ECTTtV ... 'Ypal/JavTa CTE TWV 7TOALTWV TPEI'" cXKpiTOV<; cX7TOKTEtVaL 'Ypa1fllll
aAwvaL 7Tapavo/-WJv. Evidently the prosecution against Hierocles charged others as
accomplices; cf. Hansen, Apagoge 140.
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As procedure was formalized under the restored democracy, the

pre-judicial authorities, whether the Eleven, the thesmothetai, the
boule, or the ekklesia, were chiefly concerned with the preliminary
legal questions, the legality of the charges and the defendant's plea.
The decisive arguments and the final verdict were reserved for trial
before the juries of the people. The officers of the court, who were

responsible to the court in their accountings, would have been reluctant to condemn the accused to death without trial. In the latter
half of the fourth century, the law for execution without trial in
apagoge and related procedures had become a familiar anachronism,
still on the books, but noteworthy only as a legal curiosity.
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